Strand spaces are a popular framework for the analysis of security protocols. Strand spaces have some similarities to a formalism used successfully to model protocols for distributed systems, namely multi-agent systems. We explore the exact relationship between these two frameworks here. It turns out that a key difference is the handling of agents, which are unspecified in strand spaces and explicit in multi-agent systems. We provide a family of translations from strand spaces to multi-agent systems parameterized by the choice of agents in the strand space. We also show that not every multi-agent system of interest can be expressed as a strand space. This reveals a lack of expressiveness in the strand-space framework that can be characterized by our translation. To highlight this lack of expressiveness, we show one simple way in which strand spaces can be extended to model more systems.
INTRODUCTION
Strand spaces [21] have recently emerged as a popular framework for the analysis of security protocols. Roughly speaking, the strand space corresponding to a protocol is the set of the traces of the various interactions between the principals under consideration. Using strand spaces, we can reason about the secrecy of the values exchanged between principals and infer authentication properties. One limitation of the strand-space approach is that it assumes that essentially all the information available to a principal is contained in messages received by that principal. However, there is other important information that may also be available in a security setting. For example, an adversary may have information about the protocol(s) being used. Moreover, if the same agent is playing different roles, then it may be able to combine information it gathers in its various roles. This information can be captured precisely using a formal model of knowledge. Indeed, the multi-agent systems framework used to represent the knowledge and belief of agents has been used quite successfully to reason about distributed protocols (see [7] for intuition, details, and examples). This framework is based on a notion of runs; a run is a complete description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. Early attempts at applying the multi-agent systems framework to reasoning about cryptography and security (cf. [8, 12] ) suggest that these notions of knowledge and belief can be an important component in reasoning about security, the BAN logic being an example in that particular direction [4] . Essentially, the idea is simply that information can be derived in protocols not just through the messages being exchanged, but through general properties of the system. Our current project is to define a multi-agent systems framework suitable for reasoning about security using notions such as knowledge and belief. On the other hand, strand spaces have been used successfully to reason about security protocols. Since there are similarities between the two approaches, it is worthwhile to see how much of the strand-space approach can be carried over to multi-agent systems and vice versa. This forces us to investigate in detail the relationship between the two approaches. That is the purpose of this paper.
The key issue in relating the two frameworks is the handling of agents. For our purposes, an agent is an entity (a principal, a process, etc.) that can participate in interactions. Most importantly, an agent has a state that is shared across all the interactions that the agent performs. In multi-agent systems, there is a clear notion of an agent participating in an interaction. In strand spaces, there is not. Each protocol interaction (described by a strand) is viewed as independent from all others. In fact, each strand can be viewed as representing a different agent. This approach to modeling agents is deliberate in the definition of strand spaces, and gives a theory that yields general results. Strand spaces do treat agents, in a fashion, by essentially assigning to every strand a name representing the "agent" executing the strand; see, for instance, the description of NSL spaces in [21] used to model the Needham-Shroeder-Lowe protocol. However, it is still the case that strands corresponding to the same "agent" can exchange values only through explicit communication, i.e. there is no shared state across the strands corresponding to the same "agent" name. For all intents and purposes, these strands may as well be assigned to different actual agents.
To highlight the role of agents, we provide a family of translations from strand spaces to strand systems, a subclass of multiagent systems that seem to capture the intuition underlying strand spaces. The translations are parameterized by an assignment from strands to agents. This assignment associates with a strand the agent performing the protocol interaction described by the strand.
Such an assignment captures the intuition that different strands can potentially be executed by the same agent.
Why is the role of the agents so significant? For the protocols considered in [21] , it is not. On the other hand, it is clear from the work on BAN [4] and other logics (for instance, [17, 18] ), as well as the work on information flow [13] , that belief and knowledge are useful concepts when reasoning about security protocols. As we said earlier, there are a number of ways that an attacker can gain knowledge in a system. Certainly when an attacker intercepts a message, it learns the contents of the message. But it may learn much more if it knows the protocol being run. In addition, different principals representing the same attacker may be able to pool the information they have acquired. In any case, as soon as one talks about belief or knowledge, there must be agents in the picture to which belief or knowledge is ascribed. One advantage of a multiagent system is that it explicitly identifies agents and provides an easy way to ascribe knowledge to agents (see [7] ). In the context of security, that means we are forced to reason about, for example, which principals represent the same agent or which ones may represent the same agent. (See [9, 10] for logics that carry out such reasoning explicitly and, in particular, distinguish between agents and their names.)
Significantly, our translations are not surjective. Some strand systems are not the image of any strand space, regardless of the assignment of agents to strands. This is not just an artifact of our particular translation. Any translation from strand spaces to strand systems that preserves the message history of the agents, in a precise sense, cannot be surjective. Intuitively, this is because in a strand space we cannot say "either this sequence of events happens or that one does, but not both". This indicates a fundamental lack of expressiveness in the current formulation of strand spaces.
One way to characterize this lack of expressiveness is by showing how strand spaces can be extended to be able to model arbitrary strand systems. We demonstrate one way of doing this by introducing a notion of conflict, specifying when two strands cannot both be part of the same run. We remark that the general properties of strand spaces proved in [21] , such as the bounds on the penetrator, are still valid in these extended strand spaces.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review strand spaces and multi-agent systems. In Section 3, we present the translation from strand spaces to strand systems. In Section 4, we discuss the problem of translating a strand system into a strand space, and show why in general we cannot perform the translation faithfully. In Section 5, we describe an extension to the strand space framework that is equivalent in expressive power to strand systems. We interpret our results in Section 6.
THE FRAMEWORKS
In this section, we review the two frameworks we want to relate, the strand-space framework [21] , and the multi-agent systems framework [7] .
Strand spaces
Let Å be the set of possible messages that can be exchanged by the principals in a protocol. 1 A signed term is a pair with ¾ · and ¾ Å. A signed term · represents the sending of message and is typically written · , and a signed term represents the reception of message and is typically written . We write´¦Å µ £ for the set of finite sequences of signed terms. A strand space over Å is a set ¦ of strands and a ½ The actual contents of the message and the structure of Å are not important for the purpose of this paper. trace mapping tr ¦ ´¦Åµ £ , associating each strand in ¦ with a sequence of signed terms. We typically represent a strand space by the underlying set ¦, leaving the trace mapping implicit. Strand spaces are aimed at reasoning about the security of systems in the presence of a hostile penetrator with various capabilities. In order to model such a penetrator, a notion of an infiltrated strand space is defined in [21] ; the infiltrated strand space contains both regular strands and a set of so-called penetrator strands that represent the actions available to a penetrator. For the purposes of this paper, there is no need to distinguish penetrator strands from regular strands, so we do not consider infiltrated strand spaces.
A bundle represents a snapshot of a possible protocol execution. [21] which were applied to finite bundles go through without change for infinite bundles of finite height. (Indeed, they go through for infinite bundles that are well-founded, in the sense of having no infinite "descending" sequences of the form Ò¿ Ò¾ Ò½, although we end up using only bundles of finite height in our arguments.)
Multi-agent systems
In the multi-agent systems approach, every agent is assumed to be in some local state at each point in time. Given a set of agents, we characterize a system over at a given point in time in terms of a global state; this is a sequence ¾ , where is the local state of agent . The local states of an agent intuitively encode all the information that the agent has available at a given point in time. In typical distributed systems applications, the local state includes the values of variables and a history of messages received. If we are modeling a group of agents playing a poker game, the local state may include the cards that the agent holds and the bets that have been made thus far.
To capture changes to the system over time, we define a run of the system to be a function from time to global states. Intuitively, a run is a complete description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. A point is a pair´Ö Ñ µ consisting of a run Ö and a time Ñ. The global state Ö´Ñµ describes the state of the system at the point´Ö Ñ µ. Formally, we take a system to consist of a set of runs. Informally, the system includes all the possible executions of the system, that is, all the different ways it could evolve through time.
Due to the assumptions made by the strand-space approach, namely that events in strands consist of sending and receiving messages, we consider only systems where the local state of an agent is the sequences of messages that the agent has sent and received. Thus, we deliberately ignore internal actions (or, more accurately, treat them as irrelevant).
We can formalize the above description as follows. In a message-passing system, the agent's local state at any point is its history. Of course, if is the history of agent at the point Ö Ñ µ, then we want it to be the case that describes what happened in Ö up to time Ñ from 's point of view. To do this, we need to impose some consistency conditions on global states. In particular, we want to ensure that message histories do not shrink over time, and that every message received in round Ñ corresponds to a message that was sent at some earlier round.
Given a set Å of messages, we define a message-passing system (over Å) to be a system such that for each point´Ö Ñ µ and each agent ¾ , the following constraints are satisfied:
MP1. Ö ´Ñµ is a history over Å; MP2. for every event recv´ µ in Ö ´Ñµ there exists a corresponding event send´ µ in Ö ´Ñ ½µ, for some ¾ ; 2 MP3. Ö ´¼µ is the empty sequence and Ö ´Ñ· ½ µis either identical to Ö ´Ñµ or the result of appending one event to Ö ´Ñµ.
MP1 says that an agent's local state is its history, MP2 guarantees that every message received at round Ñ corresponds to one that was sent earlier, and MP3 guarantees that histories do not shrink. We think of strand spaces as completely asynchronous messagepassing systems. Roughly speaking, strand spaces do not place any constraints on the relative order of events in different agents' histories beyond those imposed by MP1 and MP2. As argued in [7, Section 4.4 .6], we can capture such asynchrony by considering systems that consist of all runs satisfying MP1-MP3 for some set of histories. Formally, we say that Ê is a strand system if there exists a sequence Î ¾ , where Î is a set of histories over ¾ To simplify our translations, we allow an agent to send a message to itself, so and can be the same agent. some set Å of messages, such that Ê consists of all runs satisfying MP1-MP3 where agent 's local state is a history in Î at every point. We call Ê the strand system generated by Î ¾ .
Informally, the set Î specifies the possible histories agent could have. A strand system generated by Î ¾ consists of all runs satisfying MP1-3 such that agent 's histories are in Î for all ¾ .
Strand systems are closely related to the asynchronous messagepassing systems (amps) defined in [7, Chapter 4] . The main difference is that for strand systems, messages are anonymous. A message does not specify a sender or a receiver. Messages in amps, on the other hand, are not anonymous. Events have the form send´ µ ( is sent to by ) and recv´ µ ( is received by from ). The remaining differences are minor. Strand systems allow for an infinite number of agents, whereas in amps there are only finitely many agents. Amps can be easily modified so as to allow infinitely many agents. Moreover, agents are allowed in amps to have a nontrivial initial state, while for strand systems, the initial state is always the empty sequence. This was done for compatibility with the definitions in [21] .
TRANSLATING STRAND SPACES TO STRAND SYSTEMS
In this section, we consider the problem of translating strand spaces into strand systems. We do this by formalizing the strand space intuition that bundles represent snapshots of possible executions. Our construction derives the possible execution traces in terms of sequences of bundles, which are then used to construct the runs of the system.
A multi-agent system requires an explicit set of agents; a strand space does not. To perform the translation, we specify a set of agents and a particular agent assignment ¦ , which intuitively associates with each strand × ¾ ¦ the agent ´×µ executing ×. In the generated strand system, an agent behaves as if it were concurrently executing the various strands assigned to it. The motivation behind this approach is that if the same agent is in reality executing many strands, then it should share its knowledge across all the strands it is executing.
The choice of agents and the agent assignment for a given strand space is left to the model designer. Different choices lead to different multi-agent systems. As we show at the end of this section, associating a different agent with each strand enforces the basic strand space tenet that information is exchanged only through explicit messages, i.e. there is no shared state between different strands.
The translation takes as arguments a strand space ¦, a set of agents, and an agent assignment from strands in ¦ to agents.
To define the translation, we first define a relation on bundles that represents the actions that the agents in the strand space can perform. Given a strand × ¾ ¦ and a bundle , let -height´×µ be the largest such that × ¾ AE . (We take -height´×µ ¼ if no node in × appears in .) Let Ê ¼ be the strand system generated by the sequence Î ¾ . We show that Ê´¦ µ Ê ¼ , which clearly suffices to show that Ê´¦ µ is a strand system. The details can be found in Appendix A.
In light of Theorem 3.1, define the map Ì from strand spaces to strand systems by taking Ì ´¦µ Ê´¦ µ.
As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, we can model strand spaces as discussed in [21] by taking the set of agents of a strand space ¦ to be ¦, and taking the identity function as the agent assignment. This captures explicitly the intuition that strands are independent protocol executions, that for all intents and purposes may be assumed to be executed by different agents. This is the case since there is no state shared between strands, and every communication is made explicit. In other words, there is no conceptual difference between two strands ×½ and ×¾ executed by different processes of an agent or by two distinct agents if there cannot be any shared state between ×½ and ×¾.
There is a small amount of information that is lost in the translation from strand spaces to strand systems, which will become evident in Theorem 3.2 below. This loss stems from the fact that messages in strand systems are completely anonymous. For example, if agent 2 and agent 3 both send a message and later agent 1 receives it, there is no way in a strand system to tell if agent 1 received from agent 2 or agent 3. By way of contrast, in a strand space, there is an edge indicating who agent 1 received the message from. The multi-agent system framework can in fact keep track of who an agent received a message from by adding an additional component to the global state; this is the state of the environment, which intuitively describes everything relevant to the system not included in the local states of the processes. 4 We will not bother going into the details of the environment in this paper, as the issue does not affect our results. We can characterize the information loss resulting from our translation by defining a relation be- With these results in hand, we now discuss some of the choices made, in particular, why we allowed infinitely many agents, infinite bundles, and an arbitrary bijection in the definition of . It turns out that these choices are somewhat related. First observe that, in Theorem 3.2, we identified each strand with an agent. Thus, if there are infinitely many strands in the strand space, the corresponding strand system requires infinitely many agents. Naturally, if we restrict our analysis to strand spaces with only finitely many strands, then we can take the corresponding strand systems to have only finitely many agents. Infinite bundles are needed in order to prove Theorem 3.1 when there are infinitely many agents. To understand why, consider a strand space ¦, where ¦ ×½ × ¾ and tr´×Òµ · Ò . In other words, strand ×Ò has exactly one node, at which a send action is performed. If a different agent is associated with each strand, then in the corresponding strand system, the set of histories for agent Ò will consist of the empty history and the history send´ Ò µ . The system based on this set of histories has a run where all the agents send their message simultaneously at round 1. This history corresponds to the infinite bundle consisting of all the strands in ¦. Intuitively, if all the agents can send a message, there is no reason that they should not all send it in the first round.
In our particular case, the environment could record the sender of each message that is received at any given round.
Why do strand spaces allow infinitely many strands? Often, security protocols rely on nonce values, which are values guaranteed to be unique within a run of the system. Strand spaces model nonce values by specifying a different strand for each possible value of a nonce. Since, theoretically, there can be infinitely many nonces (as a consequence of uniqueness), we typically have to consider infinitely many strands for a given protocol. Note that these strands do not necessarily represent computations of different agents. Indeed, it probably makes sense to consider them all as being performed by the same agent (but at most one of them being performed in a given execution of the protocol).
The bijection in Ú is not needed if a different agent is associated with each strand. (That is, in this case it suffices to take to be the identity.) Similarly, is not needed if there is a bound on the length of all strands in ¦. Indeed, it is needed only to take care of the possibility that there is an infinite sequence of strands, each intuitively a prefix of the next, and all associated with the same agent. Intuitively, if must be the identity, then every chain must "choose" the strand it is executing, which implicitly corresponds to choosing how many messages to send in that particular run. By providing a function that permits us to "jump" to strands with the same prefix between any consecutive bundles of a chain, we are essentially modeling an agent that does not choose the length of the strand up front, but rather just performs the actions (and thus, if one strand is a prefix of another, it cannot tell which of the two strands it is performing).
While it is important to recognize these subtleties, they do not arise in most protocols. For instance, strands for specific protocols will typically be of bounded length, and therefore the bijection is not needed to define chains in the corresponding strand space.
TRANSLATING STRAND SYSTEMS TO STRAND SPACES
In this section, we consider the translation of strand systems into strand spaces. Specifically, given a strand system Ê, is there a strand space which maps to Ê under a suitable agent assignment?
In general, there is not. This result is not an artifact of our translation, but reflects a fundamental difference between strand spaces and strand systems. In particular, it does not depend on any of the subtleties that were pointed out at the end of last section.
To understand the difficulties, consider the following simple system Ê½. It essentially contains two runs Ö½ and Ö¾, with distinct messages Ü Ý Ù Ú: Under the mapping presented in the previous section, there does not exist a strand space that maps to this system, for any agent assignment. Intuitively, any strand space modeling the system Ê½ will need at least strands corresponding to runs Ö½ and strands corresponding to runs Ö¾. Since these sets of strands do not interact (that is, they do not exchange any message), the translation of Section 3 will produce a system that contains runs that amount to all possible interleaving of the strands corresponding to Ö½ and Ö¾.
This results in a system that is strictly larger than Ê½. For example, it must contain runs with the following histories for agents 1, 2, and 3:
Roughly speaking, what is happening in the strand system is that agent 2 nondeterministically decides whether to send message Ù to agent 1 or message Ü to agent 3. In any run of the system, it sends one or the other, but not both. The problem here is that, in the strand-space framework, we cannot say "one or the other, but not both".
To make this precise, given an agent assignment , define a translation Ì from strand spaces to strand systems to be -history preserving if, given a strand space ¦, 
EXTENDED STRAND SPACES
In the previous section, we showed that not all strand systems correspond to strand spaces. More precisely, we showed that some strand spaces could not be in the image of any history-preserving translation. How reasonable is the requirement that a translation be history preserving? Suppose that Ì is a translation from strand spaces to strand systems that is "acceptable" in some sense. It certainly seems reasonable to require that if Ì´¦µ Ê, then the events in every history Ö ´Ñµ that arises in Ê correspond to events that agent actually performed in some bundle. (Note that there is no need to consider infinite bundles here; if there is a bundle at all, it is finite.) Conversely, given a bundle over ¦, it seems reasonable to require that there exists a history where performs the same actions as it does in the bundle.
So exactly why is there no strand space corresponding to the system Ê½? Roughly speaking, given a strand space ¦, any set of strands that satisfies B1-4 is a bundle. Thus, once certain bundles exist, others are forced to exist too, including ones that do not correspond to any run in Ê½. For example, once there is a bundle corresponding to "2 sends Ù to 1 and gets a response Ú", and another bundle corresponding to "2 sends Ü to 3 and gets a response Ý", there has to be a bundle where 2 both sends Ù to 1 and sends Ü to 3. The strand-space framework cannot express "either this sequence of events happens or that one does, but not both". As we now show, this is essentially the only impediment standing in the way of a translation from strand spaces to strand systems. We extend the strand-space formalism with a notion of conflict that allows us to prohibit certain strands from appearing together in the same bundle, and then show that such extended strand spaces can model all strand systems. 5 Define an extended strand space as a tuple´¦ ÓÒ µ consisting of a strand space ¦, a set of agents, an agent assignment from strands to agents, and a set ÓÒ ÓÒ ¾ of symmetric relations, indexed by agents, such that ÓÒ ½´ µ ¢ ½´ µ. The intuition is that if two strands ×½ and ×¾ corresponding to the same agent are such that ÓÒ ´×½ × ¾µ, then ×½ and ×¾ conflict; they cannot both appear in the same bundle
We do not want to imply that this is the only way to extend strand spaces to achieve this effect, nor do we claim that this approach is particularly original. Indeed, there is a vast literature in concurrency theory on the subject of implementing choice constructs in various formalisms; see, for instance, [5, 14] . We can similarly define an infinite bundle as a subgraph satisfying B2-5; the notion of height remains unchanged.
Clearly, every bundle in an extended strand space´¦ ÓÒ µ is a bundle of ¦, since properties B1-4 still hold. Moreover, properties such as the penetrator bounds proved in [21] carry over to extended strand spaces.
We now consider translations from extended strand spaces to strand systems and back. We first need to check that the construction of Section 3 that translates a strand space into a strand system applies to extended strand spaces. Since a bundle in an extended strand space is a bundle in the underlying strand space, we define the set Ò×´¦ ÓÒ µ as the subset of Ò×´¦ µ where each chain is taken over bundles in the extended strand s- 
Proof:
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1. The details can be found in Appendix A.
Therefore, extended strand spaces can be translated into strand systems in such a way that chains correspond to the runs of the system. We abuse notation and call this family of translations Ì as well, where is an agent assignment (although now the domain of Ì is extended strand spaces over the agent assignment ). However, the maps Ì are now onto, and the following theorem holds. The conflict relations are defined to ensure that a bundle contains at most one strand per agent, and in fact corresponds to a global state of the system Ê. The details can be found in Appendix A.
Extending the strand space model with a notion of per-agent conflict relation is not the only way to extend the model to match the expressiveness of strand systems. For instance, it is possible to introduce a more general form of conflict specifying that an arbitrary pair of strands in a strand space cannot appear in any bundle. This notion of conflict does not require the introduction of agents in the strand-space framework. On the other hand, this extension is actually more expressive than strand systems as defined in this paper. For example, it is possible to say that a particular history of agent 1 and another history of agent 2 do not occur in the same run, something which cannot be done in a strand system. While it is straightforward to augment strand systems to capture this stronger notion of conflict, it is not clear that such a notion is of particular interest.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems. Our results show that strand spaces are strictly less expressive than strand systems, a subclass of multi-agent systems that seems to capture the assumptions underlying strand spaces, in two quite distinct respects. The first is that strand spaces cannot express choice, the fact that exactly one of two possible behaviors is chosen. The second is that strand spaces have no notion of agents.
How serious are these two issues? That depends, of course, on what we are trying to prove. Consider first the inability of strand spaces to express choice. In [21] , the types of properties proved typically have the form "for all bundles in the strand space, X happens". One way to interpret our result of Section 4 is that when a strand space is used to model a system, some of the bundles may not correspond to situations that may actually arise in the systemthose bundles can be seen as "impossible" bundles. This is not a problem, of course, if the property of interest in fact holds in the larger system. However, this may not always be the case. For example, we may well want to prove that a property like "agent 2 sends at most one message" holds in all executions of a protocol. If the protocol also has the property that agent 2 can send messages to either 1 or 3 (as is the case in the protocol described by the system Ê½ in Section 4), then the fact that agent 2 sends at most one message in every execution of the protocol will simply not be provable in the strand-space framework.
The runs of a strand system can be viewed as a linearization of bundles, that is, an explicit ordering of the actions performed by agents in different bundles. Thayer et al. [21] suggest that results about strands can be imported to runs. For example, in [21, p. 226], they say "[Alternatively,] results about authentication protocols proved in a strand space context can be imported into the more usual linear models by linearizing the bundles." Our results point to subtleties in doing this. More precisely, while results about strands can be imported to results about runs (the runs that arise from translating the strand space to a system), the converse may not be true, depending on the expressiveness of the language.
Turning to the issue of agents, the strand-space framework assumes that messages relayed between strands form the only means of exchanging information between strands. In other words, there is no shared state between strands. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, we can imagine that every strand is executed by a different agent. On the other hand, if the same agent is executing two strands then, intuitively, it should know whatever is happening on both strands, without requiring communication between them. Furthermore, as soon as one wants to analyze the properties of strand spaces using belief and knowledge, agents to which the knowledge can be ascribed are needed. But even without bringing in knowledge, we need to be careful in interpreting security results proved under the assumption that different agents perform different strands. Clearly this assumption is not, in general, true. Ideally, security protocols should be proved correct under any "reasonable" assignment of agents to roles in the security protocol. At the very least it should be clear under which assignments the result holds. For instance, it is known that methods for the analysis of cryptographic protocols that fail to handle multiple roles for the same agent do not yield dependable results, as they may not reveal multi-role flaws. Snekkenes [16] studies such flaws in the context of various cryptographic protocol logics. Multi-role flaws commonly arise when a cryptographic protocol logic implicitly assumes that if an agent takes on a role in some session, then he will not also take on another role in some different session. This assumption is often a consequence of the identification of the notions of role and agent. Snekkenes shows that reasonable protocols that can be proved correct under the assumption that an agent takes on the same role in all sessions are flawed if this assumption is dropped. Recent work on analyzing mixed protocols using strand spaces [20] shows that strand spaces can be extended to deal with what essentially amount to multi-role flaws. However, the approach often requires phantom messages (messages that are not actually exchanged during runs of the protocols) to carry state information between the different protocol strands corresponding to the same agent.
Some of the topics we have explored in this paper appear in various forms in other work. For example, Cervesato et al. [6] define a notion of parametric strand, essentially a strand where messages may contain variables. Parameterized strands correspond to roles, which are implicit in the original work on strand spaces. The work of Cervesato et al. also deals with the evolution of the system described by a strand space; they define a one-step transition between bundles. The transition is reminiscent of the one we describe in Section 3, but is restricted to extending a single strand at a time.
(They also allow actions specific to their formalization, such as the instantiation of a strand from a parametric strand.)
The set of runs in the system and the agent assignment are particularly significant when we consider specifications that are not runbased [7, 11] . A run-based specification is checked on a per-run basis. For example, "agent 2 sends at most 1 message" is a runbased specification: given a run, one can check whether the property holds for that run. A run-based specification holds for a set of runs if it holds for all runs in the set. In contrast, a knowledge-based specification [7, 11] such as "after running the protocol, agent 2 knows " cannot be checked on a per-run basis, as it relies on the set of runs as a whole to verify the property. It holds if, in all runs in the system that agent 2 considers possible after running the protocol, holds. Clearly it does not suffice to look at an individual run to determine whether such a property holds. Similarly, probabilistic specifications like " holds in at most 3% of the runs" also depend on the whole system and cannot be checked simply by examining individual runs.
Typical specifications in the security literature are safety properties (in the sense of Alpern and Schneider [1] , "bad things don't happen"), and hence are run-based. Run-based specifications have the property that if they hold in a system, they hold in any subset of the runs of the system. It is "safe" to prove that a run-based specification holds of a strand space which translates to a superset of the intended system. Proving that the property holds for "impossible" runs does not hurt. This is not the case for properties that are not run-based. We believe that knowledge-based specifications, as well as probabilistic ones, will play a significant role in the design and analysis of security protocols. Fairness is a good example. A protocol is fair if intuitively no protocol participant can gain an advantage over other participants by misbehaving. In the context of fair exchange protocols [2, 3, 15] , where two agents exchange one item for another, fairness ensures that either each agent receives the item it expects, or neither receives any information about the other's item. This notion of "not receiving any information" can be interpreted as meaning that no knowledge is gained. Our results suggest that strand spaces, as currently defined, will have difficulty handling such specifications.
We should point out that it is straightforward to reason about knowledge in the context of strand spaces. For instance, Syverson [19] describes a framework where the set of bundles in a strand space is viewed as a set of possible worlds. He associates with every strand in the strand space a principal, as we do, and uses this setting to provide a model for the knowledge of principals. As his framework is directly based on strand spaces, it suffers from the same expressiveness problems we pointed out in Section 4. This emphasizes that the problem we point out is not a problem of how to express knowledge in strand spaces. Rather, it is purely a problem with expressiveness of the models allowed in the strand-space framework.
Despite these criticisms, we feel strand spaces are an important and useful formalism. They can be used to provide simple, transparent proofs of run-based properties. Our results suggest it is worth exploring their limitations and the extent to which extensions of strand spaces (such as the extended strand spaces introduced here) retain these properties.
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We would like to thank Andre Scedrov for pointing us to fair exchange protocols as a likely source of knowledge-based specifications in security protocols. Vicky Weissman and Kevin O'Neill read a draft of this paper and provided numerous helpful suggestions. ¾ . Unfortunately, we cannot simply construct the chain inductively, bundle by bundle. While this would work if different strands strand were associated with different agents, in general, making the correct choice of strands at each step (correct in the sense that the construction will not get stuck at a later point) turns out to require arbitrary lookahead into the run. Roughly speaking, this is because it is not clear which combination of strands for agent to choose to make up 's local state in a particular bundle. Instead, we proceed as follows. Intuitively, we want to determine for each agent which strand prefix to extend at every step of the chain. Once we have found for each agent an appropriate way of extending strand prefixes at every step, it is not hard to construct the bundles in the chain.
APPENDIX

A. PROOFS
We start with some definitions. Given a node × in ¦, let tr´× µ be the prefix of tr´×µ of length . Given a bundle and an For each agent , we inductively construct the following tree, whose vertices are labeled by multisets of sequences. The root is labeled by the empty multiset. Suppose a vertex Ù at level Ñ (that is, at distance Ñ from the root) is labeled with the multiset Å.
If Ö ´Ñ · ½ µ Ö ´Ñµ, then Ù has a unique successor, also la- , we construct a successor of Ù labeled Å Ø . Note that, for all multisets labeling a level-Ñ vertex, the set of events specified by the sequences in Å are precisely those performed in Ö ´Ñµ.
Our goal is to find an infinite path in this tree. That such a path exists is immediate from König's Lemma, once we show that the tree has an infinitely many vertices, each with finite outdegree.
An easy induction shows that a multiset at level Ñ has at most Ñ elements (counted with multiplicity). Moreover, it is immediate from the construction that the outdegree of a vertex on the tree is at most one more than the cardinality of the multiset labeling it. Thus, it follows that the outdegree of each vertex is finite.
Showing that the tree has an infinite number of vertices is also 
